The Ten Ways Sam Harris is Wrong: Unraveling the Illusion of Inevitability

First in a series of ten articles in which I will show that Sam Harris is not only wrong on free will: He is dangerously wrong.

On the matter of free will, Sam Harris has chosen to weave a narrative that is as provocative as it is deterministic. At the core of his belief system lies a steadfast conviction that free will is an illusion, a mere byproduct of neurological processes that are beyond our conscious control. Harris has chosen to believe in a universe governed by the unyielding laws of physics and biology, where a cascade of neural events predetermines human thoughts and actions. This perspective, apparently rooted in neuroscience and empirical data, paints a picture of human existence where choice is an illusion, and consciousness merely observes what the brain has already decided.

In Harris's view, our sense of agency is not the driver of our actions but a passenger along a predetermined journey, intricately mapped by the complex interplay of genetics and environment. His decision to adopt this belief poses a paradox for many in science, who, facing empirical data, are concerned about the potential implications of this type of thinking on people’s understanding of the nature of responsibility, morality, and the essence of what it means to be human.

This is the first in a series of articles that will review The Ten Ways Sam Harris is Wrong.

Unraveling the Illusion of Inevitability

“All the world’s a stage”, wrote Shakespeare, as a memorable reflection on the fatalism experienced by humans as we strive to exert our will and choices upon our lives. Are we, as Macbeth, or Oedipus, fated by destiny to events and outcomes in our lives in spite of our intentions? Or do we, instead, have and experience free will, and even our intentions are predetermined?

For Sam Harris, all of the events in our lives, including our own choices, come with the illusion of free will. He chooses a bold assertion: For Harris, free will does not exist.

Harris, a neuroscientist and philosopher, weaves a narrative in the talks and his book that challenges the very core of what many believe about human autonomy.

At the heart of Harris's chosen argument is that the sense of free will we experience is nothing more than an illusion. He paints a picture where our thoughts and intentions are like leaves in a stream, emerging from unseen currents of causality deep within our minds. These thoughts, according to Harris, arise unbidden, the product of hidden processes over which we have no conscious control.

To bolster his argument, Harris chose to turn to neuroscience. He pointed to studies, including those by Benjamin Libet, which had startling results: our brains seem to make decisions before these choices bubble up into our conscious awareness. This evidence suggested to Harris that the decisions we believe we make freely are actually concluded in the depths of our neural circuitry, long before we become aware of them.

We’ll dive into the Libet study in a bit more depth, but first, let’s examine why Harris’ choice to adopt his views is hitting nerves.

Harris's chosen perspective on free will is deeply intertwined with the concepts of determinism and causality. He posits a binary: either our actions are predetermined by a chain of prior events, or they are the result of random chance. In both scenarios, the traditional notion of free will, as an independent and self-determining force, crumbles.

Yet, according to Harris, the denial of free will does not spell doom for morality or social order. He argues that understanding the illusory nature of free will can be used to foster greater empathy and societal understanding. For Harris, this realization paves the way for more humane considerations of justice, social policy, and personal relationships.

Harris chooses to distinguish between conscious deliberation and free will. While acknowledging that conscious deliberation plays an important role in our lives, Harris prefers to maintain that it does not equate to free will. The origins of our thoughts and intentions, he argues, are not self-generated in a manner that would endow us with true autonomy. This perspective challenges not only the scientific understanding of free will but also confronts deeply held religious and common-sense beliefs, which Harris views as scientifically untenable and ethically flawed.

In essence, Sam Harris has chosen to present a narrative where free will is an illusion, a tapestry of unconscious processes and deterministic or random factors. We are mere witnesses to our own thoughts. Yet, somehow, in this seeming determinism, Harris asserts that he believes it provides a basis for a more compassionate and understanding society, one where our perceptions of choice and autonomy are redefined in the light of modern science and philosophy. We will address this point in detail in a forthcoming article.

The Libet Experiment

In the 1980s, Benjamin Libet conducted groundbreaking research that seemed to challenge the very notion of free will (Libet, 1985). His experiments involved measuring brain activity while subjects were asked to respond to cues with a quick, spontaneous physical movement.

The tasks given to participants were intentionally simple. Some were asked to flex their wrist whenever they felt the urge to do so. This action was chosen for its simplicity and because it could be performed without extensive pre-planning or deliberation. In other variations of the experiment, participants were asked to press a button instead of flexing their wrists.

The simplicity of these tasks was crucial for Libet's study. It allowed for the measurement of the time between the onset of the brain's readiness potential (a kind of neural activity detected through EEG) and the participant's conscious decision to perform the action. By using such straightforward tasks, Libet aimed to isolate the decision-making process from more complex cognitive activities that might involve planning, reasoning, or problem-solving.

Libet discovered a consistent build-up of electrical activity, known as the readiness potential, occurring milliseconds before the subjects reported conscious awareness of their decision to move.

This finding was considered monumental. It suggested that decisions were made subconsciously, and our conscious mind was merely becoming aware of a choice already determined by our brain's activity. For years, this experiment underpinned the argument that free will is an illusion, with our conscious self merely observing decisions made by our subconscious.

A Flaw in the Design

However, recent studies have begun to challenge the conclusions drawn from the Libet experiment. A pivotal study by Schurger et al. (2012) reexamined the nature of the readiness potential. After intensive analysis of the literature and published data on the readiness potential (RP), their conclusion reads:

A meta-analysis found that the few Libet-like studies that had been conducted had large margins of error, and even fewer measured time differences (Braun et al., 2021). While the showed a temporal pattern consistent with Libet's original findings, the authors pointed out that there were only six studies that specifically looked at the crucial time difference between the onset of unconscious brain activity and the conscious intention to move. This time difference has key implications of conscious causation and free will.

Moreover, the meta-analysis found a high degree of uncertainty in this effect, suggesting that the conclusions drawn from Libet's original experiment might be more fragile than previously thought. In light of this new analysis, some of the foundational findings of Libet and colleagues, which have significantly influenced scientific and philosophical thinking about free will, appear to be less robust than many have assumed.

“The RP continues to be both a methodological tool and an object of study, but there are significant areas about which we remain unsure, despite advances (see Outstanding Questions). If recent models of the RP are on the right track, we cannot infer from the existence of the phenomenon that it reflects an actual signal in the brain that, in individual trials, has the characteristics of the RP, or that has causal efficacy. Because of this, one cannot infer that we lack conscious free will based on the temporal profile of the RP. If these models are correct, they may have implications for our understanding of free will, but none that avoid significant and substantive philosophical commitments. But given all the other reasons that have been raised for rejecting the classical interpretation (e.g. [3,14,16,17]), even if SDMs are mistaken and the RP does reflect a real neural signal, albeit one difficult to detect on individual trials, the RP would still fail to support the classic inference for the inefficacy of conscious will.”

More recently, a new study conducted by the HSE Institute for Cognitive Neuroscience challenges the notion that Libet used appropriate neurocognitive measures. The researchers meticulously revisited the Libet experiment, incorporating advanced EEG techniques and nuanced experimental procedures. In a major blow to the Libet paradigm, they found that the readiness potential, previously thought by some to be a clear precursor to conscious decision-making, may not have a direct link to the decisions themselves. This discovery undermines the idea that this EEG activity is the smoking gun evidence for the brain's determination of our choices before we become consciously aware of them.

Furthermore, the study sheds light on how experimental procedures can influence the moment of conscious intention. In Libet's original setup, participants were asked to note the time they felt ready to perform a simple action, like bending their wrist, while observing a moving point on a screen. The HSE team's replication of this experiment, with slight modifications, revealed that the participants' awareness of their intention could be swayed by the nature of the task and instructions. This finding suggests that the sense of intention might not be as straightforward as previously thought, and the readiness potential might reflect a more general “be-ready-to-make-a-decision” state rather than the decision-making process itself, and rather than the specific (conscious) intention to act.

As an evolutionary biologist, this makes good sense to me. Readiness potential involves what Schurger et al. calls the PMB: Premotor Build-Up. Here’s their description:

“The RP was first discovered using EEG, hence the name readiness ‘potential’ (referring to the electrical potentials measured with scalp electrodes), but it ultimately reflects a gradual buildup of neural activity in the neural tissue below the scalp EEG electrode. This buildup can be measured in other ways: when measured using magnetoencephalography, we refer to it as a ‘readiness field’, and when measured using implanted electrodes at the single-neuron level we refer to it as a ‘readiness discharge’. The underlying neural phenomenon is the same, a slow buildup in the firing rate or recruitment of individual neurons in premotor and motor areas, which we might refer to as a PMB.

The PMB is not a uniquely human phenomenon [37] as it has been observed in monkeys [87., 88., 89., 90.], rodents [91., 92., 93., 94.], fish [95], and even crayfish [96,97]. The fact that the PMB is also observed in invertebrates tells us that it is not unique to the cerebral cortex, even though the PMB is often referred to in the EEG literature as the ‘cortical readiness potential’. The signal measured using EEG most certainly originates in the cortex, but the buildup itself may emerge from an interaction between cortex and subcortical structures, notably the basal ganglia [98,99]. We suggest using the label ‘RP’ to refer to the movement-related signal measured with EEG and ‘PMB’ to refer to the underlying neural modulation measured in multiple species and with various techniques.

The particular temporal profile of the PMB in general, and the RP in particular, is an oft-neglected feature and has not been systematically studied in the way that, for example, the onset or amplitude has. Often it appears to exhibit a nonlinear exponential-looking buildup [1,13,41,86,100,101], but in other studies it appears as more of a linear ramp [2,66,102,103]. It makes sense to speak of an ‘onset’ time if the buildup is linear, but if it is nonlinear then it seems to decay asymptotically into the past and there is no principled reason to declare it to ‘begin’ at one point in time rather than another. Whether the RP/PMB is fundamentally a linear or nonlinear ramp and what the factors are that determine its shape remains unclear.”

If you’re a selectionist, you would see that because natural selection favors efficiency and life as a result of many ancestors’ successes in surviving many near-misses and scrapes with death. You’ll also recognize that a motor neuron in a resting state might be less able to respond to a decision to act. The fact that crayfish also have both PMB and RPs tells us that while such readiness is important, the mere measurement of readiness itself is woefully insufficient as a measure of the role of conscious free will in decision-making.

It’s also worth noting that the entire viewpoint those who read Libet as supporting the no-free-will viewpoint have not considered that human consciousness may be more distributed in our body than being merely restricted to our brains. Awareness of threats involves autonomic responses - reflexes - the cues that travel to the spinal cord and then back again to the peripheral nervous system with a “move” command. We literally pull a hand away from a hot object before we are aware enough to be able to make a decision to do so. The existence of such survival mechanisms does not in any way preclude the existence of free choice: our free will can also override our baser instincts - and this is a theme we will revisit again in future articles.

The new data from HSE University drastically change our understanding of the Libet experiment. The study found that experimental procedures could impact the timing of conscious intention awareness. The researchers suggest that the Libet paradigm may not at all be suitable for assessing the concept of free will. Rather than viewing the readiness potential as the brain's decision-making mechanism, it could be seen as part of a broader, non-linear process where consciousness plays a more active role in decision-making. These findings suggest that the brain's activity is not a straightforward precursor to a decision, but part of a complex interplay of conscious and unconscious processes.

The experiment also hinged on a critical and potentially flawed aspect: the reliance on participants to accurately record the moment they feel the intention to move. This method introduces a significant variable – the delay between the actual impulse to act and the participant's conscious recognition and recording of this impulse. When participants shift their attention from the internal sensation of intending to move to the external task of noting the time on a clock, this transition could introduce a lag in reporting. Moreover, the subjective nature of this process raises questions about its reliability. Our awareness of our decisions is not always precise or reliable. If one were to replicate this simple experiment, say by extending an arm and deciding spontaneously to flex the wrist, it becomes evident how challenging it is to pinpoint the exact moment of decision. Libet measured responses in milliseconds: human subjects need a minimum of about 0.1 second of visual experience or about 0.01 to 0.02 second of auditory experience to perceive duration; any shorter experiences are perceived as instantaneous. There is a wide margin of error in a decision to respond (among many possible options), full awareness of a decision, and reporting that decision within the margin of error.

Now that we know that Libet’s measurements got the timing wrong, we know that they study lacked the precision needed to assert that action occurs before thought.

The inherent difficulty in self-reporting the moment of intention alone casts a shadow of doubt over the conclusions drawn from such experiments, suggesting that our understanding of the conscious decision-making process might be more complex and less straightforward than represented by proponents of determinism. (See: How a Flawed Experiment "Proved" That Free Will Doesn't Exist - Scientific American Blog Network).

Beyond Libet: The Evolving Landscape of Neuroscience

The reevaluation of the Libet experiment is part of a larger shift in neuroscience, which now views the brain as a dynamic and adaptable organ. This perspective aligns with the concept of neuroplasticity, which shows that our brain can rewire and adapt in response to new experiences (Gazzaniga, 2010; Bassett and Gazzinga, 2011). This adaptability suggests a more active role for consciousness in shaping our decisions and actions.

There is also Daniel Dennet’s “Multiple Drafts” model of consciousness, in which we are running simulations of the present situation with variations in anticipation of matching sensory data to the best-matched simulation, which is then allowed to be brought forward, with others like it, in a consensus form of perception and awareness, which then consider in our consciousness. Such a complex process, if real, will, similarly, not be instantaneous, and thus measuring signal-response will have to accommodate uncertainty due to biological lags relative to the technological measurements which can be done in milliseconds. Biological lags on registering awareness of a decision do not dispense with free will to make that decision, and this reality is fatal to those who choose to continue to interpret the Libet paradigm incorrectly in spite of new evidence.

An AI-generated Sam Harris choosing his meal at a restaurant. Sorry, Sam! https://www.img2go.com/

Free Will in a New Light

The crumbling of the Libet paradigm has significant implications for our understanding of free will. If our conscious mind plays a more active role in decision-making than previously thought, the deterministic view of human behavior becomes less tenable. This shift not only impacts philosophical discussions but also has ethical and legal ramifications, challenging the notion that our actions are predetermined and beyond our control.

We Ignore New Science at Our Own Peril

The evolution of scientific understanding regarding the Libet experiment and brain activity signals a turning point in the free will versus determinism debate. As we move away from the view that our choices are predestined by neural processes, a new narrative emerges. In this narrative, free will is not an illusion but an integral part of the complex, dynamic interplay between our brain's biology and our conscious experience. Our decisions, far from being mere observations of predetermined neural activity, are active processes where we are both the authors and the readers of our own story.

In the next article, we will explore in detail Neuroscience and the Myth of the Puppeteer.

References

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Braun MN, Wessler J, Friese M. A meta-analysis of Libet-style experiments. Neurosci Biobehav Rev. 2021 Sep;128:182-198. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.06.018. Epub 2021 Jun 10. PMID: 34119525.Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.

Gazzaniga MS. Neuroscience and the correct level of explanation for understanding mind. An extraterrestrial roams through some neuroscience laboratories and concludes earthlings are not grasping how best to understand the mind-brain interface. Trends Cogn Sci. 2010 Jul;14(7):291-2. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2010.04.005. Epub 2010 May 22. PMID: 20547092; PMCID: PMC2940054.

Gazzaniga MS. Neuroscience and the correct level of explanation for understanding mind. An extraterrestrial roams through some neuroscience laboratories and concludes earthlings are not grasping how best to understand the mind-brain interface. Trends Cogn Sci. 2010 Jul;14(7):291-2. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2010.04.005. Epub 2010 May 22. PMID: 20547092; PMCID: PMC2940054.

Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8(4), 529-539. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00044903