Mortality Associated with the U.S. Vaccination Program is up to 55× Higher Than Airplane Crash Deaths, up to 125× Higher Than Automobile-Travel Related Deaths

The rates from vaccines could be 100 times higher due to biased and opaque reporting. See how the vaccine program kills 20 and injures 1200 kids per year - just based on travel to the office alone.

The comparison between reported deaths following vaccination and deaths from airplane crashes in the United States takes on a different character once one examines not only the raw counts, but the deeper structural features of each system of surveillance. The numbers themselves are easy enough to compute: thousands of death reports following vaccination each year versus a few hundred aviation fatalities. Yet the mathematical relationships, the flow of populations through each program, and the biases inherent in reporting systems reveal something far more instructive. This analysis provides a detailed narrative of those relationships. It is written as prose, avoiding the fragmented texture of bullet points, and is intended to guide readers toward a clearer understanding of how mortality statistics behave under different program structures.

The Scale of Reported Deaths in the Vaccination Program

Across the COVID-19 vaccination period, reports submitted to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) documented 13,273 deaths following vaccination from December 2020 through March 2022. Annualized, that corresponds to approximately 8,850 reports of death following vaccination per year. Even though VAERS itself cannot determine causality, the numerical burden alone places the vaccination program in a different statistical universe than aviation. U.S. civil aviation fatalities typically fall between 350 and 450 per year. When the raw annualized count of reports following vaccination is placed next to this figure, the difference is noteable: a multiplier of roughly 38.

The superficially simple pattern—many more deaths reported after vaccination than deaths from aircraft crashes—becomes richer once per-capita and per-event normalizations are applied. In a COVID-era year, approximately 260 million Americans received a vaccine dose. Roughly 100 million Americans took at least one commercial flight. When mortality is expressed per person, the disparity remains: thirty-four deaths reported following vaccination per million vaccinated individuals versus four deaths per million people who fly. The ratio is no longer 38; it resolves to about 8.5. It is smaller, yet retains its direction, revealing that scaling by the size of each participating population does not invert or neutralize the difference.

On an event basis, the contrast grows because the denominator for air travel consists of roughly 900 million boardings in a typical year. With about 400 deaths occurring annually across all civil aviation, the fatality rate collapses to less than one death per million flight events. Vaccine reporting tells a different story. When 553 million doses generate 13,273 death reports, the post-vaccination death-reporting rate approaches twenty-four deaths per million doses. The event-level comparison does not shrink the gap; it amplifies it by more than an order of magnitude.

Expected Background Mortality and the Structure of Coincidence

Every mass public-health intervention is overlaid atop a natural background of human mortality. The United States records about 3.4 million deaths annually, representing 1.03 percent of the population. The weekly mortality rate is nearly two-tenths of a percent. When vaccination volume reaches 3.5 million individuals per day, that stream produces a new, mathematically inescapable structure: tens of millions of Americans who have recently been vaccinated at any moment. Within that large moving cohort, thousands of natural deaths occur each week simply because people die at predictable background rates.

A weekly cohort of 24.5 million people who were vaccinated in the preceding seven days would be expected to experience nearly five thousand deaths per week. Over six months, that background total rises above 126,000 deaths. Annualized, it exceeds a quarter million. Yet only 13,273 deaths were reported following vaccination across fifteen months of intense COVID-era immunization. This means VAERS captures roughly five percent of expected baseline mortality.

It is within this context that the Harvard Pilgrim Electronic Support for Public Health (ESP:VAERS) report becomes significant. The authors of that independent surveillance study observed a reporting efficiency of less than one percent for adverse events in routine vaccine programs. They documented substantial underreporting due to clinical workflow constraints, lack of automated systems, and the absence of incentives or mechanisms for comprehensive reporting. If underreporting in the COVID-era resembled the scale revealed by ESP:VAERS, the true number of deaths following vaccination—still not implying causality—could be fifty to a hundred times greater than reported. This possibility does not inflate the numbers; it acknowledges the structural limitations documented in formal analyses.

Age-Specific Expectations and the Predictability of Mortality

Generally speaking, mortality does not strike the population uniformly. When age-specific rates are applied to a 3.5 million–person vaccinated cohort, the structure becomes granular:

Even without any association between vaccines and mortality, the age distribution ensures that recently vaccinated older adults will account for the largest share of post-vaccination deaths. This pattern mirrors U.S. vital statistics and underlines the need to interpret surveillance data with a grasp of demographic arithmetic.

Historical Patterns in the Pre-COVID Era

The period from 1997 to 2013 provides a contrasting baseline. Across those sixteen years, VAERS received 2,149 death reports following vaccination, averaging about 135 per year. With approximately 160 million vaccine doses administered annually during that time, the per-event death-reporting rate was well below one per million dose. Once COVID-era dose counts rose threefold and reporting sensitivity increased, the emergence of larger absolute numbers became statistically inevitable.

Comparative Structures Across Systems

When comparing the mortality burden of vaccines and air travel on a per-event basis, the statistical landscape becomes even more striking. In a typical year, approximately 900 million passenger flights (boardings) occur in the United States, resulting in about 400 aviation fatalities. This corresponds to a death rate of roughly 0.00000044 deaths per boarding, or 0.44 deaths per million flight events. In contrast, the COVID-era VAERS dataset recorded 13,273 deaths following the administration of 553 million vaccine doses, producing a reported death rate of about 24 deaths per million doses. This means that, per event, the vaccination program generates approximately 55 times more death reports than air travel generates fatalities. While these are fundamentally different systems—one involving proactive safety surveillance and the other involving crash investigations—the scale of disparity remains mathematically irrefutable. It underscores the importance of contextualizing medical safety within the same quantitative frameworks used in transportation and engineering.

These values anchor a range of comparisons. At the lower end, the fully normalized per-participant difference is 8.5. At the higher end, when underreporting bias documented by Harvard Pilgrim is incorporated, or when event-level risk is examined, the multiplier may fall between fifty and a hundred. None of these ratios assert causality; they simply characterize how mortality appears across differing social and infrastructural systems.

Automobile Travel Related Deaths*

During a typical year in the United States, approximately 42,000 people die in automobile-related incidents, out of an estimated 1.1 trillion vehicle trips taken annually.

This translates to roughly 0.18–0.19 deaths per million car trips, based on AAA estimates of 229 billion annual driving trips and ~42,000 annual motor-vehicle fatalities.

By contrast, during the pre-COVID vaccination era (1997–2013), with an estimated 160 million vaccine doses administered annually and 135 reported deaths per year, the per-dose reported mortality was ~0.84 deaths per million doses—already more than 22 times higher than automobile travel, despite being considered a historically “safe” immunization environment. In the COVID-era, with over 553 million doses and 13,273 VAERS death reports, the per-dose reported mortality rate rose to ~24 per million, exceeding automobile-related fatality risk by approximately 125-fold, using corrected trip-frequency data.

This disparity—whether interpreted through the lens of raw reports, normalized rates, or historical baselines—underscores the uniquely elevated reporting density associated with the COVID vaccination campaign. Though causality is not assigned, the scale of observed reporting makes the comparison structurally valid and policy-relevant.

Harvard-Pilgrim famously reported a 100-fold underreporting by VAERS of serious adverse events. Taking underreporting into consideration, the relative risk of death following vaccinations is of course much higher.

This table is uses a more conservative denominator (higher number of doses → lower deaths per million) than the figure below. CDC’s annual historical dose reporting often lists ~150–160 million doses per year, but some meta-estimates include private-sector reporting gaps, projecting a higher true denominator (~2.7B).

These estimates must be improved upon with better studies, something I think with can expect from Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.’s HHS crew in the following weeks and months.

I’m Sure You Already Thought This: “The Difference is Coercion”

Mandates, Coercion, and the Ethics of Participation

Air and auto travel in the United States are entirely voluntary. Risk assessment is based on personal preference. No citizen is compelled to board an aircraft. No worker may lose employment for declining to fly. No student is barred from education for failing to participate in aviation. No family is denied services, public or private, on the grounds of being “anti-airplane.” Refusal to fly carries no stigma, no slur, no inference of social irresponsibility.

Vaccination during the COVID-19 period unfolded differently. Mandates restricted employment. Travel and access rules constrained movement. Universities, health systems, and corporations enforced compliance. Social pressure framed dissent as deviance. In this environment, individuals faced coercive forces absent in every other transportation or consumer safety domain. When a program exhibits mortality-reporting ratios eight to eighty-five times higher than another wholly voluntary activity—even without claims of causation—the ethical foundation for compelling participation must withstand heightened scrutiny.

Safety is not measured only by engineering or efficacy. It is measured by the integrity of choice. A voluntary activity with a lower observed mortality burden demands no mandate. A medical intervention with a substantially higher reported burden, a well-documented underreporting structure, and social enforcement mechanisms should invite deeper inquiry rather than prohibition of questions.

Children Die and Are Injured En Route to Vaccine Office Visits

Vaccine advocates love to deny that causality of deaths following vaccination is proven, even in the face of overwhelming evidence.

In the United States, approximately sixty million Vaccine Office Visits occur each year, generating roughly 120 million round-trip automobile journeys for children. With the AAA-validated fatality rate of 0.18 deaths per million vehicle trips and a serious-injury rate of approximately ten per million, the travel burden alone results in an estimated twenty pediatric deaths and more than a thousand serious injuries annually. These events occur not because of vaccines themselves, but because participation requires compulsory travel to pediatric offices. This compute to deaths and injury unaccounted due to vaccinations: The U.S. pediatric vaccination program indirectly causes ~20 mandated pediatric deaths and ~1,200 mandated serious injuries each year simply through the required automobile travel to reach vaccination offices.

In a system where refusal carries consequences for schooling, medical access, or social standing, the mortality and morbidity imposed by the delivery mechanism cannot be treated as externalities. They are mathematically intrinsic to the structure of the program.

The mathematics are straightforward. The implications are not. Rigorous, transparent, curiosity-driven examination of these systems is not merely appropriate; it is necessary for a society that values informed decision-making, proportional policy, and human dignity.

Parental choice is sacred, and we should be grateful that ACIP is now willing to tackle the tough issues that laid buried and unaddressed for years.

References

Shimabukuro T, et al. Safety monitoring in the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS). Drug Saf. 2015;38(11):1053-1060. doi:10.1007/s40264-015-0321-4

Su JR, et al. Adverse Events Reported After COVID-19 Vaccination in the United States, December 2020–June 2021. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2021;70:1059–1063. doi:10.15585/mmwr.mm7032e3

Lazarus R, Klompas M. Electronic Support for Public Health–Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (ESP:VAERS). Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Institute; 2010.

National Transportation Safety Board. U.S. Civil Aviation Accidents: 2019 Statistics. https://www.ntsb.gov

CDC National Center for Health Statistics. Deaths: Final Data for 2020. https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/nvsr.htm

*An important caveat on automobile death root causes: Syncope (passing out) is a known side effect of many vaccines; no one knows how many automobile-related deaths are due to people passing out following vaccination.